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The EU’s development strategy towards its Southern near abroad resembles the development 
economic Leitmotiv of the early Nineties, i.e. the Washington Consensus with its three pillars of 
macro-economic stabilisation, structural adjustment and liberalisation. Beyond that, however, it rests 
on the modernisation theoretical basis paradigm developed by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959. In 
accordance with the optimistic convergence hypothesis, both the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers assume that economic development correlates positively with the creation of 
democratic structures in the Third Countries of the Mediterranean (TCM). In other words, economic 
liberalisation, as a prerequisite for both the introduction of Euro Mediterranean Free Trade and the 
expansion of the Euro-Mediterranean trade exchange, should lead to increasing prosperity as well as to 
the formation and the widening of middle class actors. These should, in turn, due to their newly 
acquired participation rights in the economic area, almost inevitably demand further participation in the 
political realm. Ideally, this would be followed by a political liberalisation process that encompasses the 
whole Southern Mediterranean area and that will result in a democratisation of all the TCM. 
Based on this assumption and the concept of incomplete contracting, this study aims to show two 
interrelated insights: 1.) that the main goal of the Barcelona Process, i.e. to contribute to the socio-
economic development in the TCM, has not been achieved during its first five years; 2.) that the 
envisaged modernisation theory-inspired spill-over from the economic to the political level was 
severely hampered. It will be shown that the Euro-Mediterranean trade nexus, which appears as the 
primary tool for the realisation of the EMP’s above mentioned objective, has been adjusted to the 
needs of EU-European market providers while the asymmetrical structure of Euro-Mediterranean 
trade—which was already visible during the approche globale and the subsequent ‘Renovated 
Mediterranean Policy’—as been further aggravated to the disadvantage of the TCM. The paper 
concludes with some remarks related to the linkage between the structure of Euro-Mediterranean trade 
relations and the explanatory power of modernisation theory. 
 EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/13 © 2004 Tobias Schumacher 
I. Introduction 
With the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration at the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Minister’s meeting 
in the Catalan capital at the end of November 1995 and the conclusion of the so-called Europe-
Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA’s), the European Union (EU) has re-conceptualised 
its long-standing political and economic relations with the twelve Third Countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean (TCM).
1 The objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), or the Barcelona 
Process as it is also known, is to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and 
cooperation that guarantees peace, stability and prosperity. According to the Barcelona Declaration, 
this requires a strengthening of democracy, the respect of human rights, sustainable and balanced 
economic and social development as well as measures to combat poverty.
2 Apart from conducting a 
‘strengthened’ political dialogue and close cooperation in the cultural, social and human sector, these 
aims are to be realised mainly through the intensification of bi- and multilateral trade exchange and the 
establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (EMFTZ) by 2010.  
The EU’s development strategy towards its Southern near abroad resembles the development 
economic Leitmotiv of the early Nineties, i.e. the so-called Washington Consensus with its three pillars 
of macro-economic stabilisation, structural adjustment and liberalisation (Williamson, 1993). Beyond 
that, however, it rests on the modernisation theoretical basis paradigm developed by Seymour Martin 
Lipset in 1959 (Lipset, 1959). In accordance with the optimistic convergence hypothesis (Muno, 
2001), both the European Commission and the (General Affairs) Council of Ministers assume that 
economic development—as it hoped to develop under basket II—correlates positively with the 
creation of democratic structures in the TCM. In other words, economic liberalisation, as a 
prerequisite for both the introduction of the EMFTZ and the expansion of the Euro-Mediterranean 
trade exchange, should lead to increasing prosperity as well as to the formation and the widening of 
middle class actors. These should, in turn, due to their newly acquired participation rights in the 
economic area, almost inevitably demand further participation in the political realm. Ideally, this 
would be followed by a political liberalisation process that encompasses the whole Southern 
Mediterranean area and that will result in a democratisation of all the TCM. 
Based on this assumption, and given the EMP’s overarching objective, this study aims to show two 
interrelated insights: first, that the main goal of the Barcelona Process, i.e. to contribute to the socio-
economic development in the TCM, has not been achieved during its first five years; second, that the 
envisaged modernisation theory-inspired spill-over from the economic to the political level was 
severely hampered. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that the Euro-Mediterranean trade nexus, which 
appears as the primary tool for the realisation of the EMP’s above mentioned objective, has been 
adjusted to the needs of EU-European market providers while the asymmetrical structure of Euro-
Mediterranean trade—which was already visible during the approche globale and the subsequent 
‘Renovated Mediterranean Policy’ (RMP)—has been further aggravated to the disadvantage of the 
TCM. Hence, it shall be assumed that this is due to the phenomenon of incomplete contracting, 
discernible in all EMAA’s, that principally concedes the EU and its 15 EU member states numerous 
exit-options. Against the background of the heterogeneous interest structures of the 15, the existence 
of this phenomenon has generated time inconsistency between implemented short-term policies and 
the long-term and generally agreed objectives of the EMP. 
                                                      
1   This article focuses on the TCM Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the Palestinian 
Autonomy Areas. Malta, Cyprus and Turkey are formally still members of the EMP. However, for the purposes of this 
study they will be excluded as the former two will join the EU in May 2004 and Turkey possesses an EU-membership 
perspective according to article 49 TEU and, thus, is not a part of the EU’s development association. Of all the TCM only 
Syria has not signed an agreement yet.  
2   See Barcelona Declaration. Tobias Schumacher 
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With this in view, the paper is divided as follows: After a cursory explanation of the concept of 
incomplete contracting, the subsequent section will look into the effects that incomplete contracting 
has had on the trade dimension of EU-TCM relations between 1996 and 2000. In a second step, the 
bilateral trade regime’s most relevant stipulations in relation to the establishment of the EMFTZ will 
be sifted out and, with the use of the concept of incomplete contracting, analysed with regard to their 
impact on economic development, modernisation and democratisation in the TCM. The paper will end 
with some concluding remarks related to the linkage between the structure of Euro-Mediterranean 
trade relations and the explanatory power of modernisation theory.  
II. Incomplete Contracting and Time Inconsistency  
Embedded in the politico-economic research on transaction-cost approaches and the so-called 
commitment problem, which attracted the attention of such prominent authors as North, Shepsle and 
Moe at the end of the 1980s/early 1990s in particular within the context of the new institution 
economics (North, 1990; Shepsle, 1991; Moe, 1990), the phenomenon of incomplete contracting, as it 
was mainly described by Williamson and Majone, ought to be seen as the precondition for time 
inconsistency (Williamson, 1985; Majone, 2001). While the term ‘contract’ does not only refer to a 
legal and enforceable instrument, but also includes informal and tacit agreements, incomplete 
contracting as such embodies the opposite of relational contracting. Under the latter, two contracting 
parties sign general arrangements—without the use of detailed and concrete plans of action—that 
guide their relationship. They focus only on general principles, the issue-areas to be included, the 
competences of each party and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
3 With respect to incomplete 
contracting, this means that while the parties at the contracting phase may aim at completeness 
regarding the content of their arrangement, the scope of action, their powers to act and the modes of 
profit-sharing, this completeness, however, can not really be achieved (Majone, 2001: 67). The 
incompleteness can be attributed to numerous factors such as the differing bargaining power of the 
parties, contract-related information deficits on the side of both parties, or to contingencies that were 
either unforeseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract or that were fully ruled out ex ante. 
To put it in another way: If an incomplete contract, comprised of exit-options, represents the 
framework for bi- and multilateral relations, it is very likely, taking the rationality postulate into 
account, that at least one of the contracting parties is tempted to renege on the agreement. In such 
circumstances, the latter can either try to modify the already concluded provisions and find ways to re-
negotiate them or—if this is not possible—it might feel pressure to partially or fully deviate from the 
commitment and, thus, counteract it. If such deviant behaviour occurs, it would finally indicate the 
existence of what Kydland and Prescott have described as time inconsistency (Kydland/Prescott, 
1977). According to them: 
Time inconsistency occurs when a government’s optimal long-run policy differs from its optimal short-run 
policy, so that the government in the short run has an incentive to renege on its long-term commitments.
4 
According to Majone, this is due to the fact ‘that the incentives of policymakers, or contractual 
partners, in the implementation stage may no longer be the same as their incentives in the planning 
stage’ (Majone, 2001: 67). Consequently, both phenomena, i.e. incomplete contracting and time 
inconsistency, lead to the same result—the lessening of the credibility of the original arrangement. 
                                                      
3   As an example of relational contracting, Majone names the Treaty of Rome for the establishment of the EEC. See Majone 2001, p. 68. 
4   Giandomenico Majone, ‘Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-
Cost Approach’, JITE—Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157 (2001), p. 62. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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III. The Europe-Mediterranean Association Agreements as Contractual Basis of Euro-
Mediterranean Trade Relations  
Due to the differing progress in the negotiations of the EMAA’s, trade relations between the EU and 
the TCM in the five years between 1996-2000 were conducted on non-congruous legal foundations. 
While in the case of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco, the old cooperation 
agreements still represented the relevant trade regimes—for the latter two at least until March 1, 1998 
and until March 1, 2000 respectively—in early 1996 and in Summer 1997 two interim trade 
agreements with Israel and the Palestinian Autonomy Areas (PA) came into force.
5 These interim 
agreements, reflecting the trade stipulations of the EMAA’s almost identically, as well as the two 
agreements with Morocco and Tunisia after their enforcement, still distinguish between agricultural 
and industrial goods. As was already the case in the cooperation agreements, the Community abstains 
from applying tariff and non-tariff-barriers on industrial imports coming from the TCM. Nonetheless, 
under the EMP it has been maintaining the textile and clothing self-restraint agreements which it 
managed to impose on Morocco and Tunisia in the mid-seventies.
6 While this obviously represents a 
continuation of the status quo, the fact that all EMAA’s commit the TCM to also remove all tariff and 
non-tariff barriers for industrial goods from within the EU is a novelty with serious consequences as 
will be shown later.
7 With the exception of Israel, which already had removed all its trade barriers for 
industrial imports from EU member states in 1989, article 10 and 11 of the new agreements with 
Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan as well as article 8 of the interim agreements with the PLO granted these 
four countries transition periods for the dismantling of tariffs (on industrial goods) of a maximum of 
five (PA) and twelve years respectively (Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan).
8 
In contrast, the contractual arrangements on trade with agricultural and fishery products are more 
elaborated and also more restrictive. Significantly, the Barcelona Declaration says: 
[…] taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural policies allow 
and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural 
products will be progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access among the parties […]
9 
This formula makes visible that the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), based on protectionist 
and non-market economy-related principles, has impeded full liberalisation of agricultural trade with the 
TCM. Hence, the EMFTZ project focuses on industrial products only and excludes agricultural produce. 
Two further aspects must be highlighted. First, the Barcelona Declaration refers to traditional trade flows 
as a basis of assessment for the trade preferences as specified in the EMAA’s. Notwithstanding that this 
provision cannot be justified by any particular economic reason, the reference to ‘traditional’ trade flows 
as such is to the detriment of the TCM as their agricultural export contingents already between 1972 and 
1990 were massively restricted. Thus, these do not serve as a beneficial starting point for determining 
new trade preferences in the context of the EMP. The latter’s maintenance of the export contingent for 
Tunisian refined and non-refined olive oil—a product of utmost importance to the Tunisian agricultural 
industry—or the decrease of the maximum ceiling for Israeli orange exports, exemplify this fairly 
clearly. While the annual maximum quantity for Tunisian olive oil exports traditionally, i.e. between 
                                                      
5   The cooperation agreements were concluded in the context of the Global Mediterranean Policy between 1975 and 1977. 
6   See Appendix I of the EMAA with Tunisia as well as the Agreement in form of an exchange of letters between the EC 
and Morocco on Article 12 (1).  
7   See for example article 8 of the EMAA with Israel and article 4 of the interim agreement with the PLO for the benefit of 
the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
8   See for instance article 11 (4) of the EMAA with Morocco. It allows the Moroccan government (in the event of serious 
difficulties) to change the timetable for the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers for those industrial goods listed in 
the annex of the agreement if the bilateral Association Committee gives its approval and if such a change does not affect 
the overall transition period of twelve years. Note that trade with industrial goods between the EU and the Occupied 
Territories was already partly liberalised in 1987 with the adoption of the Council regulation 1134/91 (OJ L 112/1991). 
9   Barcelona Declaration. Tobias Schumacher 
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1976 and 1995, amounted to 46,000 tons, the EMP, despite widespread reductions or even the full 
removal of import duties, has kept a firm hold on this ceiling. For Israeli orange producers the rules of 
the game have even deteriorated. Since the interim agreement came into effect, they are only permitted 
to export a maximum quantity of 200,000 tons, which, in fact, represents a decrease of 30% compared 
with the former ‘traditional’ ceiling. 
Second, the above mentioned provision explicitly mentions that further trade liberalisation for 
Southern Mediterranean agricultural goods is only possible to the extent that national policies allow 
so. Although it is not clear whether this formulation refers to the agricultural policies of the EU 
member states, it must be assumed that, in light of the comparative cost and competition advantages of 
the TCM-agro-producers, it relates to the market conditions on the Community market. Responsible 
for the inclusion of this provision were in particular the governments of the Southern European EU 
member states and, to a lesser degree, those of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. As this informal 
alliance stood for a limited expansion of concessions in the field of agricultural trade during the 
negotiations of the EMAA’s, they finally succeeded in breaking the resistance of those Northern EU 
states that were—and still are—in favour of a more consumer-oriented approach and wider (free) trade 
preferences respectively.
10 Against that background and in consideration of both the relatively high 
share of employees in the agricultural sector of many EU states and the importance of the agricultural 
sector for gross domestic products, it is more than likely that in the immediate years to come there will 
not be an interest convergence in the Council of Agricultural Ministers with respect to the inclusion of 
agro-trade into the EMFTZ in the sense of a true ‘complete contracting’.
11 
The absence of a homogeneous intra-Council interest structure related to a common and single 
treatment of industrial and agricultural products is expressed in the fact that those EU member states that 
support agricultural free trade were in fact successful in expanding the decrease of tariff-barriers under 
the EMP to the majority of Moroccan, Tunisian, Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian agro-exports. 
However, under the influence of the above mentioned informal alliance, they had to accept that the rather 
generous reductions of the Common Custom tariff (CCT) were to be restrained by a highly complicated 
system of non-tariff barriers that targeted every potential Southern Mediterranean agricultural export 
product. The old practice, already applied during the Global Mediterranean Policy, of a (nowadays full) 
dismantling of tariff barriers hand in hand with an introduction of restrictive export calendars, export 
contingents, and reference prices primarily for fruits, vegetables, olive oil, cut flowers, fish and wine, is 
therefore still discernible in all EMAA’s in the form of endless protocols and additional agreements. 
That the new trade regimes still exempt the TCM’s agricultural products from free trade neither 
poses a major problem to Israel, with its high degree of industrialisation and its diversified production 
sector, nor to the PA, with their low export capacities and their concentration on industrial trade.
12 For 
net agricultural producers like Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan however, and also for Egypt and Syria, 
once their agreements enter into force, this asymmetrical trade liberalisation will have serious 
consequences. It makes it extremely difficult for them to implement their cost advantages in the 
agricultural sector and to realise micro- and macro-economically important growth potentials. This is 
further hampered by the underlying principle of reciprocity that is now guiding Euro-Mediterranean 
trade relations. Reciprocity, ‘often invoked as an appropriate standard of behaviour which can produce 
                                                      
10  On the Swedish position, see Tobias Schumacher, ‘The Mediterranean as a New Foreign Policy Challenge? Sweden and 
the Barcelona Process’, Mediterranean Politics 3/2001, pp. 90. On Northern perceptions of the EMP, see Richard 
Gillespie, ‘Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process’, Afers Internacionals 37/1997, pp. 65-75. 
11  At the time of the Barcelona Conference 3.1% of the total workforce in Germany, 7% in Austria, 4% in the Netherlands, 
5.2% in France, 7% in Italy, 8% in Spain, 14.2% in Portugal and 20.3% in Greece worked in the agricultural sector. In 
Germany the agricultural sector has a share of the GDP of around 1.1%; in Austria the share is 1.4%, in the Netherlands 
3%, in France 2.3%, in Italy 3%, in Spain 8%, in Portugal 4% and in Greece 14%. 
12   The PA’s concentration on industrial trade is mainly due to the shortage of land that otherwise might be used for 
agricultural purposes. Hence, the PA, with the financial support of the EU, the US and Japan, has been advocating the 
creation of industrial parks like for example in Jenin and the Gaza Strip. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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cooperation among sovereign states’
13, for the very first time legally commits the TCM to remove 
their custom and non-custom trade barriers for EU agricultural goods and, thus, exposes their domestic 
markets to stronger competition from EU-European suppliers (Hoekman, 1999: 94). 
IV. The Effects of Incomplete Contracting on the Development of the TCM’s Exports to 
the EU 
The quantitative, absolute volume of all exchange interactions between the EU and the TCM in the 
period between 1996-2000 has continuously increased. When compared to previous years, the trade 
volume throughout this five year period shows a new record high for each year with 2000 standing out 
with an absolute total amount of 96071 Million ECU. This is almost a doubling of the top figures of 
1985 and 1994. The overall trade volume is not, however, evenly distributed. Instead, it is, as in earlier 
phases of the EU’s Mediterranean Policy, to a large extent made up by the quantitatively high trade 
links between the EU, Algeria and Israel respectively, followed by—although at a distance—EU trade 
with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, as can be seen in graph 1. 















Source: Eurostat, External and intra-European Union trade—Statistical Yearbook 1958-1999; Monthly Statistics 1/2002. 
Graph 1, moreover, contains another important insight. It shows that the trade volume between the 
EU and all TCM has increased, albeit to different degrees. This increase took place irrespectively of 
whether the old cooperation agreements, an EMAA or an interim trade agreement previously formed the 
legal framework of bilateral trade relations. The fact that it was obviously irrelevant for the TCM’s 
export performance which trade regime they were allowed to export under is further illustrated by the 
import and export development of each bilateral relation. Apart from Jordan, all those TCM that were in 
possession of a new association agreement were able to achieve new export records. In comparison with 
the highest figures achieved during the RMP in the period 1990-1995, Moroccan, Tunisian and Israeli 
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exports to the EU between 1996 and 2000 were 49.5% (Morocco), 62.9% (Tunisia) and 113.1% (Israel) 
higher (Schumacher, 1998). In the three-year-period since the entering into force of their interim trade 
agreement the PA managed to achieve an export growth of 324%, however from a very low level that 
amounted to only 340.51 ECU in 1996.
14 Considering that neither Algeria, the Lebanon or Syria had a 
new EMAA during 1996-2000, their increase-rates look even more impressive with 130%, 128.2% and 
97.5% respectively. In addition, when the absolute export quantities of the individual TCM’s are 
compared with each other, it is noticeable that Algeria (2000: 16422 Million ECU) and Israel (2000: 
9927 Million ECU) stand out, i.e. the two of the TCM with the highest share of industrial production at 
the GDP. On the EU-European side it is France, Italy, and Greece together with Spain, Belgium and 
Luxemburg, absorbing a total percentage of at least 46% of the TCM exports annually, that are the main 
purchasers of TCM exports. In contrast, the importance of Portugal, the Netherlands and Austria as 
export markets has drastically decreased since 1996, though it must be mentioned that this trend, as far as 
Portugal and the Netherlands are concerned, already began under the RMP. 
Indeed, both the old and the new Euro-Mediterranean trade regimes have had a positive effect for 
some of the TCM insofar as they resulted in an improvement of the latter’s status as EU-trading partners 
for certain exports.
15 Nonetheless, this positive aspect cannot conceal that neither the share of these 
TCM’s exports nor the share of the other TCM of the EU’s total imports from third countries has 
improved. Also the structure of Southern Mediterranean exports has remained the same, as it still mainly 
consists of low value-primary goods.
16 As is discernible in table 1, compared to the situation during the 
approche globale and the RMP, the share of imports coming from the TCM of total EU imports—with 
the exception of hydro-carbonate-exporting Algeria of course—has decreased or stagnated. 
Table 1: Share of EU-Imports from the TCM of Total EU-Imports, 1996-2000 (in %) 
  Algeria Morocco Tunisia  Egypt  Jordan Lebanon Syria  Israel  PA 
1996  0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0  0.3  0.9  0.0 
1997  1.2 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0  0.3  0.9  0.0 
1998  1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0  0.2  1.0  0.0 
1999  1.0 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0 
2000  1.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0 
Source: Eurostat, External and intra-European Union trade—Statistical Yearbook 1958-1999; Monthly Statistics 1/2002. 
What is more, this development has serious consequences for the TCM as the EU is still the main 
export market for at least half of all Southern Mediterranean exports. It is in this light that it must be 
claimed that the new trade regimes had a rather ambivalent effect in the five-year-period during 1996-
2000. In the case of Israel, they merely reflect the trend towards diversification of Israeli export targets 
that began in the early nineties. In the Tunisian and Moroccan case, the EMAA’s have either resulted in 
a further export expansion (Tunisia) or have simply confirmed the trend that started in 1998 (Morocco).
17 
Indeed, this might be interpreted as a sign of the dynamic intensification of the bilateral trade exchange 
(Rhein, 1999, 14). However, given that in 2000, already 80% of Tunisian exports and, after an increase 
                                                      
14  Not included in this figure are those goods that were exported via Israel. 
15  These exports are fish, crab-fish and molluscs, vegetables, fruits, semiconductors, transistors, diodes, cathodes and micro-
switchings (Morocco), medical and pharmaceutical products, organic chemicals, synthetics in primary forms, 
telecommunications, picture and sound technique, non-metal minerals (Israel), fertilizers (Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, 
Egypt), inorganic chemicals (Israel, Morocco), aerospace equipment (Algeria, Morocco), clothing equipment (Tunisia, 
Morocco). Due to the EU’s energy dependency Algeria, Egypt and Syria, although they did not possess an EMAA during 
the period between 1996-2000 were among the ten most important hydro-carbonate suppliers to the EU. 
16  Only Israel’s export structure is marked by both agricultural and high quality non-agricultural goods. 
17  Whereas the EU in 1997 absorbed 60.7% of all Moroccan exports, this figure until 2000 constantly rose to 74.3%. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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of 12%, 74.3% of Moroccan exports went to the Community market, this asymmetrical trade 
dependency is a highly perilous tendency that strongly hampers both any efforts to diversify exports and 
to find new markets outside the EU. A similar development can also be identified with respect to Syria 
and the Lebanon, if only on the basis of the old cooperation agreements. While the orientation of Syrian 
exports towards the EU had already been on the increase since 1990, they reached a new maximum 
value in 2000 with the EU absorbing 65% of all Syrian exports. In the case of Lebanese exports to the 
EU, the latter represented a share of 16% of all Lebanese exports in 1996, i.e. shortly after the 
introduction of the EMP, but rose to 25.6% at the end of 2000. 
While Egyptian and Algerian exports to the EU, despite some fluctuations, during the same period 
amounted to 39% and 63% of their total export volume, thus substantiating the EU’s position as their 
most important trading partner, the Community is of less importance to the Jordanian and Palestinian 
export industry. Although Jordan has not reached the record of 1993 its absolute EU-specific exports 
have almost constantly increased. The percentage of those exports that are allotted to the EU, however, 
after the considerable increase-rates between 1995 and 1997 decreased until 2000 to a meagre 3.3%. 
Even worse, the average share of Palestinian exports reached not more than 0.2%. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that the new interim trade agreement neither contributed to break the unbalanced 
Palestinian export dependency on Israel nor did it sustain the originally higher share of 0.7% that the 
Palestinians achieved in 1995 without any trade arrangement at all.
18 
V. The Effects of Incomplete Contracting on the Development of the TCM’s Imports 
from the EU 
To make the Euro-Mediterranean trade picture complete, it is necessary to include both the import-
development and the development of the trade balance. From the TCM’s perspective, the latter is 
sobering, as, with the exception of Algeria and Syria, none of them since the start of the EMP was able 
to either even out the negative trade volume or to turn it into a surplus. 
Table 2: Trade Balance EU-TCM, 1996-2000, in Mio. Ecu 
  Algeria Morocco Tunisia  Egypt  Jordan Lebanon Syria  Israel  PA 
1996  -5449 466  706 2955 1018 2590  -622  5131  0.037 
1997  -4008 578  1269 4118 1025 2941  -672  5236  0.036 
1998  -6823 1270  1489 5070  979  2666  63 3969  0.069 
1999  -7777  1067 1249 5541 1079 2453  -497  5158  0.088 
2000  -10320  1714 1799 4418 1440 2594  -1666  5804  0.069 
Source: Eurostat, External and intra-European Union trade—Statistical Yearbook 1958-1999; Monthly Statistics 1/2002. 
EEC Special Trade. 
Despite the fact that Algeria and Syria, due to their capital intensive hydro-carbonate exports, 
managed to keep their positive trade balance,
19 the EU has once again found a way to use both the old 
cooperation agreements and the new trade regimes to its own advantage. The EU products exported 
between 1996-2000 into the Southern Mediterranean area do not only massively exceed the TCM’s 
absolute exports in the same period but also almost without any exception the absolute amounts of 
goods that the EU had exported during all earlier phases of its Mediterranean Policy until 1995. It is in 
particular the increase of the absolute exports to the PA that stand out. Of all exports to the TCM, 
exports to the Occupied Territories in the West Bank and Gaza are the only ones that have doubled 
between 1997 (37251.27 ECU) and 2000 (74439.05 ECU). 
                                                      
18  According to PALTRADE the average export share of Israel amounts to 95%. See www.paltrade.org  
19  This was possible despite a reduction of their percentage of the total exports and an increase of their imports from the EU. Tobias Schumacher 
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The expansion of the EU’s absolute exports, however, is not accompanied by an increase of the 
TCM’s export share of the EU’s total exports to non-EU countries. Instead, since 1996 their share 
amounted to a minimum of 5.4% and a maximum of 5.9% with Israel being the main recipient. Within 
the EU all member states, with the exception of Portugal, markedly increased their absolute exports to 
the TCM while the share of exports going to the Southern Mediterranean has grown particularly strong 
in the EU’s youngest members, Sweden, Finland and also Greece (Eurostat, 2000). It must be pointed 
out that when distinguishing between the EU exports in the five year-period 1996-2000, industrial 
goods as well as agricultural produce dominate with the latter having been marked by a strong 
increase. Against the drop that the majority of export quantities of Southern Mediterranean agro-goods 
in the context of the EMP have either decreased or stagnated, the increase of imports of food and 
agricultural products weighs heavily for the TCM. This is mainly because it shows that their decade-
old food dependency on the EU has still not improved. Table 3 expresses this imbalance with regard to 
the most important agricultural products very clearly: 
Table 3: Trade Development EU-TCM of Selected Agricultural Goods, in 1000 Ecu 
Animal livestock  Milk and eggs 
1992 1997 1992 1997 
 
exports imports exports imports exports Imports exports Imports 
Algeria  11  25297 - 11131 -  346317  -  258521 
Morocco  181  19327 42 18344  428  38840  -  24278 
Tunisia  212 9254  82 14147 22 32870  -  28188 
Egypt  1461 17956 1392 12690  37  92973 1311 72653 
Jordan  14  4595 - 7422  37  36569  5  47432 
Lebanon  30 16652 31  103993  44 57257 79  101215 
Syria  -  2978  -  1289  20 25224 83 28710 
Israel  1622  3440  2400  4890  4916 12643 4030 20816 
Grain  Fruits and vegetables 
1992 1997 1992 1997 
 
exports imports exports imports exports Imports exports Imports 
Algeria  1996 348224  -  289546  22385 36219 17153 63903 
Morocco  121 180836 199 130812  664274  11937  569032  15488 
Tunisia  417  34747  956 116273  62674 7603 50379  18209 
Egypt  1064  64143  839  197596  103031 27997 111102 45397 
Jordan  70  25823  2  11199  2338 4155 9019 5868 
Lebanon  280  23053  129  36487 3087 13599 3861 15681 
Syria  31  89002  3752 9052 5458 4412 4815 5274 
Israel  8122  127607  7527  266357  472346 81235 407343 78874 
Source: Femise 1999. 
In light of this asymmetry, it becomes obvious that the EU is still far away from achieving the 
objective as stated in the various EMAA’s, namely to contribute to ‘the expansion of harmonious 
economic and social relations between the Parties’
20. That the EMP and the newly concluded association 
agreements create a ‘climate conducive to the development of their economic relations, in particular in 
the fields of trade and investment’
21 must be strongly questioned. Irrespective of whether trans-
                                                      
20  Article 1 (2) paragraph 3 of the EMA with Morocco.  
21  Preamble of the EMA between the EU and Tunisia. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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Mediterranean trade is based on the old or the new association agreements, the decade-old pattern of 
Euro-Mediterranean trade, primarily benefiting EU-European export companies due to the contractual 
inclusion of exit-options into the EMP acquis, still continues to exist. In addition, it has substantiated the 
TCM’s status as ‘reliable’ and ‘secure’ purchasers of both EU-subsidised agricultural surpluses as well 
as of high-quality industrial goods that do not face any major competition. 
VI. Incomplete Contracting and the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone 
As this study has hitherto shown, Euro-Mediterranean trade relations between 1996 and 2000 were 
conducted on the basis of incomplete contracting and to the disadvantage of the TCM. In light of the 
guiding assumption, the following sections, however, will concentrate on the main stipulations regarding 
the establishment of the EMFTZ and their short- and long-term effects on economic development, 
modernisation and democratisation. The focus is on the compatibility of the EMFTZ with the relevant 
GATT-rules and on the external effects of the EMFTZ. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of 
the dismantling of tariffs on the markets, the state budgets and the investment climate, and, finally, by a 
critical discussion of the rules of origin and the contractually agreed transition periods. 
The GATT-Conformity of the Europe-Mediterranean Association Agreements and the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Zone 
As is widely known, all EMAA’s comprise provisions that stipulate the creation of bilateral free trade 
zones until 2010. However, the current international GATT regime which has been in effect since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay round, still considers free trade areas as a deviation from the Most 
Favoured Nation Clause. They are only permitted under certain circumstances that are specified in 
article XXIV GATT. According to article XXIV 7(a) GATT, free trade areas must be notified with the 
WTO and, according to article XXIV 7(b), can be further examined by the contracting parties of the 
GATT and the WTO committee for regional trade agreements, respectively. Article XXIV 8(b) says 
that it has to be the objective of a free trade area to eliminate ‘substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories’ within an appropriate time. In 
accordance with the fifth paragraph of article XXIV ‘appropriate’ is usually defined as ten years. An 
exception to that time limit is only possible if the parties concerned can sufficiently justify the reason 
of the required extension. With the exception of the EMA with Israel and the interim trade agreement 
with the PLO, all other EMAA’s stipulate a transition period of twelve years in the field of industrial 
trade. With regard to agricultural trade all EMAA’s contain two almost identical provisions. These are 
exemplarily expressed in article 16 and 18 of the Moroccan EMAA. They provide both the 
Community and the respective TCM to gradually implement greater liberalisation of their reciprocal 
trade in agricultural and fishery products and, from January 1, 2000, to assess the situation with a view 
to determining the liberalisation measures to be applied by the Community and the TCM. 
Whereas the TCM’s elimination of market access barriers over a period of 12 years might be justified 
by both the TCM’s status as developing countries, by the EMP’s goal to gradually integrate them into the 
world economy and with a reference to article XXIV (5)c,
22 article 16 and article 18 are marked by their 
incomplete state. Notwithstanding that January 1, 2000 has been determined as the starting date for a 
new assessment although the EMAA’s with Morocco and Jordan had not even entered into force at that 
point, they are vague, lack any hint of concrete liberalisation measures with respect to article XXIV 8(b) 
and avoid any reference to a possible liberalisation period. Indeed, at first sight and in light of their 
incompleteness they give the impression of being in conformity with the GATT as they do not explicitly 
exclude the possibility to establish a free trade zone in the agricultural sector and, thus, to eliminate 
                                                      
22  Article XXIV (5)c GATT states that ‘any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan 
and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.’ Tobias Schumacher 
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‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ on ‘substantially all the trade’.
23 However, this is 
not the case. Instead they lack any legally binding indication that the exemption of agro-goods from free 
trade is only a temporary provision to last for less than ten years. In addition, given the protective 
treatment of non-industrial goods by the EU, it is very likely that the exclusion of agricultural products 
from free trade will go beyond the ten-year GATT formula (Lannon, 1997: 799). 
The Tariff Discrimination of Non-Members of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone 
Article XXIV points to another aspect closely related to the creation of free trade arrangements (Wyatt-
Walter, 1995: 79): in the context of the establishment of regional free trade areas, trade barriers for non-
members of the zone must not be raised. Although this has not yet happened in the context of the EMP, 
the TCM’s unilateral dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers for EU-European industrial imports is 
discriminatory to the extent that non-members of the EMFTZ are still faced with the originally (higher) 
custom duties and, thus, comparatively higher export prices. As the EMFTZ obviously stands in sharp 
contrast to forms of ‘open regionalism’, Southern Mediterranean purchasers of import goods will most 
likely substitute their original non-EU providers for those suppliers that are based in the EU and that can 
make full use of the free trade provisions. According to the insights of external trade theory, this will 
almost automatically lead to a deterioration of the competitiveness of non-EMFTZ members on the 
TCM’s markets as well as to a diversion of trade flows and an expansion of imports from the EU 
respectively. Moreover, it will also increase the TCM’s trade dependence of the EU and aggravate both 
their negative trade balance and their strained balance of payments. 
Apart from these effects, the dissimilar tariff treatment of imports from EU-suppliers and from 
third countries implies additional macro- and micro-economic cost potentials. Assuming that importers 
from within the Maghreb or Mashreq region before the entering into force of the EMFTZ provisions 
have purchased their imported goods from the cheapest supplier on the world market and not from the 
usually more expensive competitor from within the EU, products of the latter become less costly once 
the abolition of tariffs is completed. In reality, however, import companies as well as the national 
economies are faced with higher factor-costs since the original (comparatively higher) price for the 
imported good has not changed. In this context Bernard Hoekman, a World Bank economist, explains: 
By not discriminating across potential trading partners, domestic firms and consumers will be 
allowed to buy goods and services from the most efficient suppliers, wherever they are located. By 
granting preferential treatment to specific countries, trade diversion may occur—the elimination of 
tariffs may induce consumers and firms to source from suppliers located in a partner country that 
are less efficient than those located in non-member countries.
24 
To the disadvantage of TCM importers, EU-exporters are also given the chance to exploit the tariff 
dismantling and raise the prices for their industrial exports to the extent that they would lie 
considerably above the original prices but still below the prices of competing non-EMFTZ members.
25 
Even if the TCM tried to counteract such a possible exploitation by increasing their export volume to 
the EU it would be rather unlikely that they could compensate for these rising costs. The old 
cooperation agreements already allowed the tariff-free export of Southern Mediterranean industrial 
goods and did not result in a considerable increase of industrial exports. Additional (compensatory) 
exports to countries outside the EU are also problematic as their import barriers for goods from the 
TCM remain in place. As a consequence, it can be concluded that with the introduction of the EMFTZ 
                                                      
23  Article XXIV 8(b) GATT. 
24  Hoekman, 1999, 89. 
25  However, the extent of these increasing relative costs and the obvious allocation problems must be seen in a relative light, 
since the EU—as mentioned above—with the exception of the PA already is the TCM’s most important supplier. On that 
point, see also Ghesquiere 1998, p.12 and Nienhaus 1999a, p. 99. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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project the terms of trade have deteriorated for the TCM and also for those third countries that aim to 
export to the Southern Mediterranean area. 
The Impact of the Tariff Dismantling on Markets, State Budgets and the Investment Climate in the 
TCM 
Even if the above mentioned price-increases would not occur and even if input-costs for imported 
means of production and intermediate products became cheaper, the creation of the EMFTZ is bound 
to have a negative effect on the markets of the TCM. The reduction of input-costs principally offers 
chances to lower the production costs of a particular good, to let customers benefit from these cost-
cuttings and, thus, to increase demand. However, this increase may trigger a decline in demand for 
those local products that do not rely on external input-factors, or that use input-factors which come 
from third countries still being exposed to custom duties. These producers are neither in possession of 
the relevant financial and technical resources nor do they have the necessary expertise to adjust their 
products to the changed market conditions.
26 In a best-case scenario this, in turn, will result in a partial 
release of the workforce and in a production reduction. In the worst case, however, it could lead to the 
closure of production centres. Such a development also cannot be ruled out in those cases where 
imported high-value industrial products directly compete with local goods. E.g. in the case of Morocco 
and Tunisia, independent studies of the OECD assume that the introduction of free trade will eliminate 
around 60% of the local industries. Such a development, in turn, will irrefutably aggravate the existing 
socio-economic problems (Schumacher, 2002a) and widen the rising employment in the informal 
sector (Chourou, 1998).
27 In addition, it will increase the migration pressure which in particular the 
Southern European EU states need to see reduced. Although to a much lesser extent, similar risks can 
be detected in the agricultural trade sector. In light of the reciprocity which the TCM have granted the 
EU in the agricultural sector, it cannot be ruled out that local agro-producers, faced with highly 
subsidised and artificially cheap EU agricultural imports, will be put under severe competition 
pressure at the beginning of the partial liberalisation and, hence, be confronted with a loss of their 
comparative cost and competition advantage.
28 
Additional problems relate to the complete dismantling of tariffs on industrial imports. As can be 
seen in table 4, with the exception of Israel, import duties are an important income source for all the 




                                                      
26  See also Nienhaus, 1999b, p. 508. Of all industrial enterprises in the TCM, family-led manufacturing businesses with less 
than ten employees amount to 42% in Tunisia, 50% in Morocco and Israel, 88% in Lebanon, 89% in the Occupied 
Territories, 93% in Jordan and to 95% in Egypt. They absorb between 20% and 45% of the overall workforce and 
produce 10%-25% of the GDP. They are all characterised by low capital provision, the use of family members as 
workforce, the use of low-technology-intensive means of production, a business management based on family structures 
and the phenomenon of informal borrowing. 
27  In studies of both the World Bank and the European Commission it is in particular the rising competition pressure on the 
local industries that is considered as principally positive. According to their line of argumentation, the rising competition 
pressure will result in a break-up of inefficient monopolies and oligopolies, and will lead the governments to implement 
economic reform steps. 
28  The cost and competition advantage will not fully disappear as imports from within the EU are also exposed to import quotas.  
29  Data for the Occupied Territories are not available. Tobias Schumacher 
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Table 4: Income from Custom Duties in the TCM, 1997 
Custom Duties  Custom Duties on EU Imports   
% of total income 
tax 
% of total GDP  % of total income 
tax 
% of GDP 
Algeria  23.4 2.7  15.2 1.8 
Morocco  17.6  3.7 9.2 1.9 
Tunisia  29.8 3.5  21.7 2.6 
Egypt*  17.1  3.6 6.8 1.4 
Jordan  31.6 5.1  15.2 2.5 
Lebanon**  56.9 6.8  36.7 4.4 
Syria**  13.9  2.4 6.8 1.2 
Israel  0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Source: FEMISE 1999, 24. * = 1995; ** = average 1994/96. 
In particular the fiscal structure of Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria are largely based on customs duties. 
In the case of Lebanon, customs duties even account for almost 57% of its tax revenue. If tariff 
barriers for industrial imports from the EU were now eliminated within the envisaged twelve-year 
transition period this will lead to massive income losses which negatively impact upon the TCM’s 
GDP and their state budgets. Furthermore, if the tariff elimination results in a diversion of the import 
demand in favour of European goods, a further cut of customs’ revenues, aggravating the income 
losses, must be expected. Whereas Israel, that already dismantled its tariffs for EU-European industrial 
imports in 1989, is able to compensate for these (minor) losses without any major difficulties, they 
pose an enormous fiscal political challenge to the Lebanon. 
In principle, the TCM in order to counterbalance these losses must either find other income sources or 
cut costs in their unproductive and expensive public sector. The latter option can be carried out by wage- 
or job-cuts. Of course, both measures immediately lead to substantial cost savings. Nonetheless they 
have the potential to provoke a deterioration of the customer’s purchasing power as well as a rise of 
political costs. Due to the dismissal of the hitherto privileged technocratic and bureaucratic clientele, 
these political costs might occur in the form of a decrease of elite loyalty. In contrast, the first option, i.e. 
to open other income channels, includes the alternative to either incorporate all layers of society into the 
tax system or to raise direct or indirect taxes.
30 Even though all these steps seem to be comprehensible 
from a macroeconomic point of view they would, however, have a counterproductive effect. In light of 
the low salary structure and the high unemployment rates, a tax rise and an expansion of the tax base 
would not only have negative effects on the consumption in the TCM. In light of their colonial past both 
measures would be politically extremely difficult to carry through. The majority of Mediterranean Arab 
societies would most probably blame the EMP and interpret such steps as a ‘new stage of neo-colonial 
relations characterized by unilateral exploitation’ (Kienle, 1998: 10). In addition, they would jeopardize 
the interests and prebends of the middle and upper classes, i.e. of those parts of society that serve the 
autocratic regimes as clientele networks and a power basis.  
Another important aspect within the context of the tariff dismantling is pointed out by economist 
Volker Nienhaus. Whilst the Southern Mediterranean markets’ high level of protection definitely offered 
companies in the industrial sector—protected against foreign competitors and by making use of the low 
salary structure—incentives to invest in the TCM in order to supply the relevant market free of any 
import duties, the introduction of the EMFTZ could trigger the opposite effect (Nienhaus, 1999b: 510). 
                                                      
30   The use of the value-added tax system is relatively new to the TCM. Whereas Israel introduced it already in the 
beginning of the 1980’s, Morocco introduced it in 1986, Tunisia in 1988, Egypt in 1991, Algeria in 1992 and Jordan as 
well as the PA in 1994. Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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As they will lose the strategic advantage of the previously protected markets and, hence, have to face EU 
competitors, the chances are rather high that companies from non-EU countries will either close their 
production facilities once the dismantling of tariffs has been completed, or they will relocate them to 
those European countries that offer a similar wage structure or even more favourable economic and 
political basic conditions and that will also be included in the EMFTZ. Arguably, such compensatory 
locations would most likely be the Central and Eastern European EU accession states. Eventually, the 
consequence would be a net-outflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) generating new lay-offs which, 
in turn, are bound to have a negative effect on the socio-economic situation in the TCM. That the 
outflow of FDI could hardly be avoided and that the EMFTZ will not lead to an increase of FDI 
(Ghesquiere, 1998: 7) is further substantiated by four points.  
First, based on the assumption that the provision of favourable investment conditions in the TCM is 
mainly the task of the ruling regimes (Sideri, 2000: 8)—that had already failed to comply with this task 
during the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the IMF at 
the end of the 1980s and early 1990s—all actual statistics reflecting the investment risks in the southern 
Mediterranean do not point to a major improvement. FDI inflows are fully liberalised only in Egypt, 
Jordan and Lebanon whereas outflows are subject to strong restrictions particularly in Algeria and Syria. 
Moreover, the liberalisation measures, as they are required in the EMP’s second basket, as well as the 
ongoing tight economic situation in the TCM, considerably reduce the scope of action and the spending 
capacity of the political elites with regards to the creation of potential investment incentives.  
Second, with programmes like FEMIP, ECIP, MED-partenariat, MED-enterprise, BC-Net 
(Business Corporation Network), BRE (Bureau de Rapprochement des Entreprise), Euro-Info-
Correspondence Centre, Business Centre und Europartenariats, the EU can hardly be said to be in 
possession of a fully-fledged investment-specific resource system. Due to its low financial provisions, 
its strong concentration on the transmission of information and since it is little-known, this somewhat 
emerging system is deficient and could not yet pave the way for considerable investment decisions and 
joint ventures. In addition, both the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAA’s are incomplete as they do 
not contain binding provisions relating to FDI in the TCM. Also the character of all implemented 
measures within the framework of MEDA was rather similar with the sectoral investment programmes 
applied by the World Bank (Hunt, 1999: 28). Given that the latter were met with widespread 
disapproval by most of the TCM and that they have not resulted in an improvement of the investment 
climate, the effect of the EU policies must be questioned even more (Kienle, 1998: 7). 
Third, the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAA’s alike regard regional cooperation between the 
TCM as a key factor in the context of the EMFTZ project. At the same time, however, they conceive 
the sectoral EMFTZ only as a vertical construct. In other words: Whilst industrial trade between the 
fifteen EU member states and those of the TCM that have ratified an EMAA or an interim trade 
agreement is conducted on the basis of abolished tariff and/or non-tariff barriers, this does not apply to 
the horizontal level, i.e. to trade between the TCM themselves. Whereas the EMAA’s state that 
regional cooperation should be promoted, the Barcelona Declaration simply stipulates that it shall be 
envisaged on a ‘voluntary basis’. Hence, the only noticeable initiative in this regard is the so-called 
Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA), better known as the Agadir Process.
31 Initiated on 
May 8, 2001 and finally concluded on February 25, 2004 by the governments of Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Jordan in the Moroccan capital of Rabat, it is the objective of MAFTA to abolish all 
existing trade barriers between the four signatories and to provide economic actors within the area 
with common rules regarding certificates of origin, standards and specifications, intellectual property, 
dumping and mechanisms to resolve trade disputes. The EU, however, did not play a major role in the 
setting up of MAFTA. Although having been present in Rabat through Commissioner Chris Patten and 
                                                      
31  In 1997 the so-called Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was formally established by the governments of 14 Arab 
states. Due to inner-Arab rivalries, the slow implementation of the dismantling of tariffs and insufficiently defined rules 
of origin GAFTA, nowadays comprised of 15 member states, has not yet made any real progress. Tobias Schumacher 
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the representative of the current Irish Presidency of the EU, Patrick O’Connor, it was only visible in so 
far as it gave its principal consent and as it pledged 4 million € to be funded under MEDA.  
That the EMP does not formally commit the TCM to intra-regional free trade leads to what has 
been described in international economic relations as the hub-and-spokes phenomenon. This means 
that companies aiming at serving the Southern Mediterranean markets do not have an incentive to 
invest locally or to maintain existing production facilities unless the tariffs between the TCM are 
removed. Instead, from an external trade perspective, it is more worthwhile to serve the TCM (the 
spokes) free of any trade barriers from a location within the EU (the hub). 
Fourth, notwithstanding the insights of modern neo-liberal theories that particularly emphasise the 
knowledge of cultural aspects as one of the central preconditions for successful and sustainable 
investment activities (Fukuyama, 1995), the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAA’s ignore the 
differing social norms and cultural, local and mentality-related conditions on the markets of the TCM. 
In light of the fact that personal ties and grown client based relationships determine market access in 
the private sector to a large extent, the EU with the EMP has missed another opportunity to sensitize 
potential European investors towards this problem. Hence, particularly medium-sized companies still 
have massive reservations as regards investing in the TCM, and fear high transaction costs. 
Overall, it becomes apparent that not only net welfare gains related to the regional and the Euro-
Mediterranean economic and trade development have failed to materialize. Also the optimistic 
assessment put forward by the European Commission in its communication of March 8, 1995 that ‘the 
perspective of a Free Trade Zone Europe-Mediterranean increases the attraction for private European 
investments’ (COM(95) 72final) was proven to be wrong. This was finally admitted by the 
Commission itself in September 2000 (COM(2000) 497final) and also is underlined in table 5. 
Table 5: Foreign Direct Investment in the TCM from the EU-Member States, in Million Ecu 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Algeria  10  8  11  13  4  10  6  4  0  1 
Morocco  258  298  370  188  215  240  966  336  884  266 
Tunisia  127  450  562  452  253  221  325  600  345  804 
Egypt  204  354  421  1056  457  501  786  960  667  n.D. 
Jordan  -10  31  -29  2  10  12  318  n.D.  n.D.  n.D. 
Lebanon  2  3  5  6  27  63  132  n.D.  n.D.  n.D. 
Syria  n.D.  n.D.  150  211  76  70  71  73  247  n.D. 
Israel  243  444  509  363  471  272  735  698  1251  2167 
PA  n.D.  n.D.  n.D.  n.D.  -1  35  7  27  20  n.D. 
Source: European Commission/eurostat: Euro-Mediterranean statistics 1/2000 and 1/2001 
n.D. = no data available 
Any future increase of this low level—in total only 2% of EU-European FDI flow into the Southern 
Mediterranean—is additionally hampered by the EMAA’s specific and incomplete design of the rules of origin. 
The Cumulation of Origin of Regional Input-Factors 
Principally, free trade agreements between at least two parties contain rules of origin that in a very 
detailed and technical language specify those export products for which preferential treatment, i.e. 
customs free treatment shall apply. As is widely known, rules of origin presuppose that the traded 
goods are fully manufactured in the country participating in the free trade area, and, thus, make sure 
that they fall under the jurisdiction of the granted preferences. In order to consider goods that are Survival of the Fittest: The First Five Years of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations 
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partially comprised of imported input-factors, three different forms of cumulation of origin can be 
distinguished (Tovias, 1997: 105). The first form, i.e. bilateral cumulation, implies that in order to 
benefit from the application of the removal of tariffs, it is irrelevant whether the used input-factors 
were exclusively produced in country A or country B. The second form is diagonal cumulation. In the 
case that at least three countries A, B, C establish a free trade area, diagonal cumulation allows for a 
product from country A, to be exported to country C to fall under the freedom of tariffs although it is 
comprised of input-factors from country B. As a consequence, the product is treated as a product from 
country A despite the fact that it contains parts that were manufactured in country B. The third form, 
full cumulation, expands the freedom of tariffs to such an extent that in order to make use of the 
preferences it is finally irrelevant whether a traded product from country A is further manufactured or 
enriched in country B or C. Under such circumstances it is possible to relocate production capacities 
without losing the granted freedom of tariffs for the respective good.  
Looking at the association agreements, however, it becomes apparent that the TCM originally were 
only granted bilateral cumulation. As a consequence, Moroccan producers, for example, while 
manufacturing a certain product may use input-factors from any EU country without being forced to 
prove the ‘sufficient transformation’ of these commodities. Hence, there is no need to declare the 
product as Moroccan before it can be exported to the EU’s market. That the EMAA’s and the interim 
agreement with the PLO do not go beyond bilateral cumulation does not only contradict the EMP’s 
objective to promote intra-Southern Mediterranean trade. It is also counterproductive as regards the 
envisaged dynamisation of foreign direct investment in the TCM. In the relevant politico-economic 
literature there is unanimous agreement about the fact that the granting of diagonal cumulation would 
lead to a strong increase of intra-regional and sub-regional trade between the TCM and have a positive 
effect on the competitiveness of their industrial goods (Nienhaus, 1999a and Tovias, 1997). The latter 
can be explained by the fact that producers in the TCM can make use of those comparative cost and 
competition advantages that may exist for certain materials in one or more of the TCM’s and, thus, 
have the chance to improve the market position of their goods in relation to competitive EU-European 
products. Furthermore, diagonal cumulation would have the potential to integrate the TCM into a net 
of interdependencies. It is needless to point out that such a net could also generate political synergy 
effects as far as the EMP’s overall goal is concerned, i.e. to transform the Mediterranean area into a 
zone of peace and stability. 
However, it is particularly under the conditions of bilateral cumulation that these chances will be missed 
and producers from the Southern Mediterranean will be forced to produce their input-factors themselves at 
a higher rate even though they could be acquired from another of the TCM to a better price. Arguably, this 
substantiates the hub-and-spokes character of the EMFTZ as those companies located within the EU are in 
a position to benefit from access to all the TCM and their price-worthy intermediate goods, while access is 
denied to entrepreneurs possessing production facilities in the Southern Mediterranean.  
That the EMAA’s only contain bilateral cumulation is due to the lack of a homogeneous interest 
structure in the EU. Whereas the Commission repeatedly argued in favour of diagonal cumulation, the 
Council of Ministers since 1995 was confronted with a coalition of veto-players on the one hand and 
supporters of an expansion of the rules of origin on the other. As textiles and processed food products 
from the TCM producers would benefit from diagonal cumulation, in the Council government 
representatives from all those EU countries that possess major production capacities in these sectors 
fear stronger competition from third countries. 
Although the conclusions of the Cannes European Council of June 26-27, 1995 mention that 
cumulation between all parties concerned should be ‘gradually introduced’,
32 protectionist 
governments managed to succeed with their position. Surely, they had to accept that the German EU 
Presidency in its formal conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Minister’s meeting in 
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Stuttgart in April 1999 included a paragraph whereby it emphasised the importance of cumulation of 
origin with regards to the TCM’s integration into the world economy, and also the possibility to 
introduce full cumulation.
33 This formulation, however, is not precise and not seen by them as 
politically or legally binding. Nonetheless, one exception was acceptable to all fifteen member states. 
The EMAA’s with Morocco and Tunisia contain cumulation rules that are limited to a potential 
cumulation within the Maghreb thereby excluding all the other TCM.
34 This exception is not the 
expression of a temporary interest convergence in the Council. Instead it is due to the fact that similar 
stipulations that were already included in the old cooperation agreements with the three Maghreb 
countries were not used in the past and, hence, not considered as important.
35 
It is only very recently that the EU-15 have eventually managed to agree on the revision of the 
much-debated cumulation rules though it must be pointed out that this adjustment is part of the EU’s 
efforts to bring in line and harmonise its future policies towards its ‘new neighbourhood’. As a 
consequence, trade ministers at the Euro-Mediterranean trade ministerial conference in Palermo at the 
beginning of July 2003 endorsed the new Protocol on rules of origin which finally allows extension of 
the pan-European system of cumulation of origin to the 12 TCM. 
The Transition Periods 
The contractually agreed transition period of twelve years is highly problematic. On the one hand it is 
the low development level of most of the TCM and the negative effects of trade liberalisation, as 
outlined above, that indicate that the Southern Mediterranean markets may not be able to withstand the 
harmonisation pressure, and that a period of twelve years is too short.
36 On the other hand it is in 
specifically the graduality of the liberalisation process that may turn out to be counterproductive: In 
order to compensate for the loss of tax incomes that may occur in the case of those products whose 
custom tariffs will be dismantled during the first years of the EMFTZ, governments of the TCM could 
be tempted to additionally subsidise and/or protect those goods that are supposed to be liberalised at 
the end of the liberalisation period.
37 This, however, would either lead to welfare losses as it would 
keep companies artificially alive although they are actually not competitive. Or a major opportunity 
would be missed to use this transition period to adjust and adapt companies to the changing market 
situation, thus avoiding shock therapy which otherwise might be unavoidable once the EMFTZ has 
entered into force. This could lead to the postponement of political costs—in the form of resistance of 
the economic actors concerned against the actual liberalisation—and, thus, to misleading investment 
signals. In other words: urgently needed FDIs would not flow into (then protected) enterprises 
although some of them might have been principally attractive investment targets. 
Notwithstanding the economic logic of the transition period’s duration it is furthermore discernible 
that the Barcelona Declaration’s target date for the implementation of the bilateral EMFTZ, i.e. 2010, 
will be missed. As all the TCM, with the exception of Israel and the PA, are given a twelve-year-
period to dismantle their external tariffs, 1998 would have been the date for all agreements to enter 
                                                      
33  See Euromed Synopsis 50, April 16, 1999: ‘22. Ministers stressed the central role that cumulation of origin has to play in enhancing 
effective economic integration in the region. They called for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure that a system with identical 
rules of origin opens the way to full cumulation throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area as soon as possible.’ 
34  See article 4 of title II of Protocol No. 4 of Morocco’s EMAA. 
35  See for instance article 1(2) of Protocol No. 2 of the EC’s Cooperation agreement with Morocco. 
36  Please note that the original association agreement with Greece contained a transition period of 22 years whereas in the 
case of the Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey and Cyprus a transition period of 32 and 30 years 
respectively has been agreed. 
37  Except for the EMAA with Israel, all other EMAA’s grant the TCM the maintenance of state subsidies during the first 
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into force if 2010 was to prove maintainable. However, except for the association agreement with 
Tunisia, by then no other contract was ratified or even signed. 
VII. Conclusion 
As has been outlined, the EMP and the EMFTZ project in their current design and structure are not 
viable palliatives to improve the micro- and macroeconomic conditions in the TCM in the short- and 
mid-term. Apart from the fact that their design is adjusted along the needs of EU-European producers 
of industrial goods, the EMFTZ, when analysed against the background of the EMP’s second basket’s 
overall objective and the EMP’s other development-oriented goals, is characterised both by a 
remarkable ambivalence as well as by clear incomplete contracting. 
On the one hand, the EMFTZ in its current conception risks to contradict the normative stabilisation 
objective, understood as a triggering and maintenance of a sustainable socio-economic development in 
the TCM. As has been shown, there is a relatively high risk that the implementation of the EMFTZ 
brings about massive disadvantages for the vast majority of the TCM’s societies and that the latter might 
consider the costs of adaptation as too high. One potentially negative effect is an increase in social 
imbalance which, in turn, could lead to social unrest and thus a deterioration of the already unstable 
socioeconomic conditions (Nienhaus, 1999b: 517). On the other hand, however, the EU by using the 
EMFTZ seems to give priority to the support of the political and economic steering elites over the 
normative objectives, democratisation and strengthening of civil societies. In the context of the EMFTZ 
project this problem is expressed by the fact that the implementation of the liberalisation measures is 
closely linked to the willingness of both the ruling regimes and their client-oriented networks. They, 
however, are not at all interested in a broad political and economic liberalisation and, in contrast to other 
societal actors, stand a good chance of surviving and even benefiting from the modernisation process. 
The increasingly growing competition pressure will only be withstood by those companies that possess 
sufficient export capacities and that have the means to adapt themselves to the changing economic 
climate and market conditions. Clearly, these are not the many small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) but rather those companies whose economic elites, due to their cooptation through the political 
elites, have the relevant financial and technical resources at their disposal.  
Moreover, with the exception of Israel, in all the TCM the political and bureaucratic elites and their 
family networks openly act as entrepreneurs and, hence, in contrast to the non-coopted SME, can benefit 
from the capacities of the state apparatus. This is, of course, also the case when state monopolies are 
opened up and prepared for privatisation. In such a case lay-offs of existing overcapacities are extremely 
likely. However, they do not concern the political and economic elites as they are the ones—the 
Moroccan industry conglomerate Omnium Nord Africain which is owned by the Filali family is a prime 
example in this context—who possess the financial means to acquire the privatised objects. The former 
state monopolies are thus transformed into private monopolies as the ownership structure and the 
property rights remain, as a matter of fact, the same as before. In the words of Kienle: 
The impact of economic liberalization moreover is limited by the creation of enterprises by the rulers 
and their relatives, who thus transform their political capital into economic capital. Economic 
liberalization stops where it affects captive markets or elite profits. This truncated economic 
liberalization even reinforces—or at least consolidates—the dominant position of the rulers which it 
is sometimes supposed to weaken. The influence and the power that they lose through the contraction 
of the public sector comes back to them through their own private enterprises.
38 
This observation leads directly to the modernisation theoretical basis paradigm which the EMFTZ is 
implicitly based upon. That the Council of Ministers and the Commission in the context of the EMP in 
all their documents and writings that were published between 1994 and 2000 link the EMFTZ project 
with Lipset’s (optimistic) findings is not only problematic but even unjustified. Whilst numerous 
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quantitative studies of the last forty years, written by such prominent scholars such as Oberndoerfer, 
Huntington/Dominguez, Hadenius, Russet/Monsen/Sirowky/Inkeles  and Przeworski/Limongi, have 
shown that there hardly is a causal linkage between economic and political development,
39 this study has 
shown that the creation of democratic structures in the TCM is reduced by the EMP to a by-product of 
macrosociological and macroeconomic structures. Therefore, Przeworski’s and Limongi’s rather 
generally formulated criticism of the determinism of modernisation theoretical approaches and their 
analytical neglect of the role of political actors in democratisation processes applies to the EMP’s second 
basket too (Przeworski/Limongi, 1997: 176). Furthermore, neither the Barcelona Declaration nor the 
association agreements specify ‘development’. Instead, they give the impression of being based on a 
universally valid development concept which aims for the realisation of democratic conditions, the rule 
of law and the institutionalisation of a market economy. This impression, however, is misleading. 
Whereas there may be a common understanding over these development norms within the EU they are 
neither shared by the political and societal elites in the TCM nor do they consider the cultural and 
socioeconomic specifics in the Southern Mediterranean. 
Finally, even in the case that causal relations between economic development and democracy do exist, it 
could be shown that this linkage in the context of the implementation of the EMFTZ did not materialise 
during 1995-2000 due to the strong influence of the phenomenon of incomplete contracting. Hence, the 
optimism as regards the democratisation and economic modernisation in the area between Rabat and 
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